潘明明;刘连光;叶远誉;田世明;

• 1:华北电力大学电气与电子工程学院
• 2:国网江西省电力公司
• 3:中国电力科学研究院

摘要(Abstract)：

在能源互联网的构想中,电力用户将与电力公司展开充分互动,作为需求侧管理(demand-side management,DSM)中最重要的策略之一,负荷转移的执行模式也将随之发生变化。DSM的执行涉及到用户的参与程度,但现阶段DSM和博弈论的综合研究中仅考虑用户参与与否。为此,将用户实际参与概率(频率)加以考虑,构建了一个调峰指标分摊下用户之间的非合作博弈模型,其中每个用户通过决定何时参与DSM来最小化满足日常用电需求的期望效用(用电成本),并基于虚拟博弈算法提出了一种求解近似混合策略纳什平衡点即参与概率的算法。最后,应用实际数据仿真计算出了用户参加的概率,并验证了所提算法的收敛性。

关键词(KeyWords)： 能源互联网;非合作博弈;需求侧管理;负荷转移

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金(51577058);; 国家电网公司科技项目(521820140017)~~

作者(Author): 潘明明;刘连光;叶远誉;田世明;

Email:

DOI: 10.13335/j.1000-3673.pst.2015.11.011

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